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using the system in-the-loop (SIL) testbed is presented.
In [10-15], hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testing
platforms for different studies including distributed
generation and power electronic interfaces are
discussed. Examples of cyber-physical testbeds to
study different concerns related to power system cyberattacks can be found in [16, 17]. These papers describe
the testbed setup but quite often do not elaborate on the
full benefits of large-scale testbed concept.
Our paper describes the following three testbeds
and elaborates on their benefits.
The system-in-the loop (SIL) testbed is used to
evaluate a new synchrophasor based fault location (FL)
application
[18].
The
full-scale
end-to-end
synchrophasor testbed allows evaluation of the FL
algorithm under real power grid operating conditions,
and its robustness can be quantified under various
failures in the synchrophasor infrastructure.
A real-time simulation platform for hardware-inthe-loop evaluation of distribution-level microgrid
controllers is developed and implemented in [19]. The
proposed solution turns an offline power system
simulation tool into an online tool by wrapping it with
the necessary timekeeping and interface algorithms,
which can be used to test the performance of physical
controllers.
The Cyber-Physical Security (CPS) testbed is a cosimulation platform that integrates real, simulated, and
emulated components or subsystems [20, 21]. It is
composed of three key components: (i) industry-grade
SCADA, (ii) RTDS, Opal-RT for real-time digital
simulation of power system, and (iii) a wide-area
communication emulator for mimicking the channel
characteristics of communication between substations
and control center.
A brief background of each testbed concept is
explained in Section 2. In Sections 3, 4, and 5, the
procedure to set up the SIL, HIL, and co-simulation
testbed Use Cases is outlined, the hypothesis why the
testbeds are beneficial and how the benefits can be
achieved is stated, and examples of the results of Use
Case testing of fault location algorithm, renewable
generation interfacing, and cybersecurity solutions are
presented.
The conclusion with summary of
contributions is given in Section 6.

Abstract
This paper deals with two issues: development of
some advanced smart grid applications, and
implementation of advanced testbeds to evaluate these
applications. In each of the development cases, the role
of the testbeds is explained and evaluation results are
presented. The applications cover the synchrophasor
systems, interfacing of microgrids to the main grid,
and cybersecurity solutions. The paper hypothesizes
that the use of the advanced testbeds is beneficial for
the development process since the solution product-tomarket cycle may be shortened due to early real-life
demonstrations. In addition, solution users’ feedback
to the testbed demonstration can be incorporated at an
early stage when making the changes is not as costly
as doing it at more mature development stages.

1. Introduction
In last few decades, smart grid emerged as a
solution to fulfill the need to facilitate connection of
renewable energy resources to reduce the carbon
footprint compared to legacy fossil fuel plants [1].
Smart grid protection, monitoring, and control tasks are
improved by adding system-wide monitoring and
control capabilities through synchrophasor systems [2].
In addition, smart grid allows interfacing of the legacy
grid with microgrids, plug-in hybrid electric vehicles,
and energy storage [3]. As a result of such technology
deployments, there is a growing concern about
cybersecurity and privacy of smart grid solutions [4].
The practical approach to study impacts of such
advancements on the power grid is through
implementing proper testbeds, so to avoid the
demonstrations interfering with actual power systems
operation. New generation testbeds are designed and
implemented using actual power system control
equipment interfaced with actual grid and/or
simulation software to allow replication of full-scale
cyber-physical system performance at a large
laboratory scale. Several papers addressed the
development of the power system cyber-physical
testbeds [5-17]. In [5-9], concept of end to end testing

URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10125/41548
ISBN: 978-0-9981331-0-2
CC-BY-NC-ND

A. Mehrizi-Sani
Washington State University

1
3231

2. Background
The SIL testbed assumes that a control system and
a physical system are tied together in an
implementation that resembles the production
environment of actual control systems. The only
differentiation is that the SIL production environment
is not connected to control actual power system but a
system model instead. An example of an SIL for a
synchrophasor testbed is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 2. Overall structure of the proposed
software-based HIL simulation platform
exact application. As discussed later in this paper, the
setup developed in this work uses PSCAD/EMTDC as
the simulation engine, NI LabVIEW as the hardware
interface, and NI cRIO as the physical controller
hardware.
Figure 3 shows the architecture of the PowerCyber
testbed that consists of SCADA hardware/software
with emulation and simulation capabilities that include
substation automation system (Siemens SICAM PAS),
control center software (Siemens Power TG), SCADA
and substation communication protocols (DNP3, IEC
61850, IEEE C37.118), and security technologies
(Scalance: Firewall, VPN), four multifunction
protection relays (7SJ610, 7SJ82), three SEL 421
PMUs and a Phasor Data Concentrator (PDC) to
provide a realistic electric grid cyber infrastructure.
Power system simulations are performed using realtime digital simulators such as RTDS and Opal-RT and
using DIgSILIENT PowerFactory software for nonreal time analysis.
The testbed employs virtualization technologies to
address scalability concerns and reduce development
cost. The testbed has also been integrated with the
Internet Scale Event and Attack Generation
Environment (ISEAGE) [22] to provide wide-area
network emulation and advanced attack simulation.
The testbed uses cyber-attack tools such as nmap,
WireShark, and Nessus for cyber security and attackdefense experimentations. The testbed provides a
cyber-physical power grid environment wherein
realistic experiments on wide area monitoring, wide
area control, wide-area protection (WAMPAC), and
distributed decision making in the smart grid can be
carried out. The testbed is being utilized for carrying
out three main research tasks: (a) vulnerability analysis
in the cyber layer; (b) impact analysis due to successful
cyber-attacks; and (c) cyber security validations and
attack-defense evaluation studies to evaluate the
effectiveness of security measures [21].

Figure 1. Synchrophasor SIL testbed architecture
This production system is implemented using
commercial products and instrumented to allow for
new applications to be embedded and evaluated
through interaction with the rest of the system
components. It consists of multiple Phasor
Measurement Units (PMU), substation and control
center Phasor Data Concentrator (PDC), and a
Software Defined Network (SDN) controller for
emulation of different communication protocols and
network features.
It contains a full suite of
synchrophasor software from Alstom/GE, integrated
with OSISoft PI historian and Esri GIS software. The
input measurements come from three sources: actual
network, real time simulator (OPAL-RT), and signal
generator. The power system network is modeled after
an actual power grid, so the test cases are scaled to a
real-life application. As elaborated later on in this
paper, this testbed is used to evaluate a new fault
location technique developed using measurements of
the electromechanical wave propagations initiated by
system faults [18].
Figure 2 shows the overall structure of the proposed
HIL simulation platform. This platform uses available
commercial off-the-shelf components for an accurate
and functional solution to evaluate the performance of
a physical controller for microgrid applications. This
solution has the added advantage of flexibility,
affordability, and ease of use. The size of the system,
number of I/O (input/output) signals, and the controller
hardware can all be customized as needed based on the
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Figure 3. PowerCyber CPS Testbed

These electromechanical waves travel through
different paths with limited speed (compared to
electromagnetic one) and arrive at remote buses with
specific time delays, which could be detected by
monitoring phasor angle at PMU locations in the
system. Since propagation delay depends solely on the
network parameters, Dijkstra's shortest path algorithm
can be deployed to build a database of propagation
delays between different buses of the system. The
proposed fault location method detects Time of Arrival
(ToA) of electromechanical waves at different PMU
locations using first and second derivative of phase
angle signal. Then determines the faulty line using an
optimization algorithm that minimizes the norm of
accumulative error between actual measured delay and
calculated error from the database. Once the faulty line
is detected, the fault location is calculated within the
faulty line using binary search algorithm [19].
To evaluate the performance of such application
prior to deployment in the field, one has to represent a
complex power system and to take into account various
data quality issues in the synchrophasor infrastructure.
It allows verifying the performance of application in
the conditions very similar to what is found in the field.

3. SIL testbed use for developing and
evaluating synchrophasor fault location
application
In the last two decades, availability of synchronized
measurements utilizing PMU devices has become a
turning point in power system monitoring, protection
and control [23]. In this section, we use the SIL
synchrophasor testbed to evaluate a newly proposed
fault location method in realistic field conditions.

3.1. Application development
Faults occur in power system due to reasons
including extreme weather condition and vegetation,
animal or human contacts. Once protective relays send
trip command to circuit breakers to clear the fault, the
location of fault must be determined to facilitate
troubleshooting and minimize restoration time [24].
Following a fault on a transmission line, powerflow
re-routes in the power system, and triggers a mismatch
between generators’ electrical and mechanical torques
which are located in the vicinity of fault. To
compensate the mismatch, each generator rotor angle
changes with regard to its reference angle which results
in powerflow redistribution. Similarly, the adjacent
generators’ rotor angles start slipping against their
reference angle to compensate the mismatch. In this
manner, the oscillation known as “electromechanical
wave” propagates through the entire network [25].

3.2. Testbed set up
Figure 4 shows the configuration of the SIL testbed
for evaluation of fault location application. The testbed
is implemented using various commercial solutions
acquired through partnership agreements with major

3
3233

Figure 4. SIL testbed configuration for FL evaluation

vendors in this area, such as Opal-RT, OsiSoft and
several PMU vendors.
The evaluation using the testbed configuration
shown in Figure 4 allows the users to do the following:
 Run real-time simulation of different power system
models and studies (such as faults, load or
generation outage and topology control) with OpalRT simulator. The RT-LAB software suite is the
connection point between software and hardware
parts of the SIL system.
 Send voltage/current signals through Opal-RT
analog I/O board and scale them with power
amplifiers. RT-LAB software suite allows
employing virtual PMUs within software and
directly sends PMU streams via C37.118 protocols
to PDC.
 Measure phasor (GPS synchronized) values of
signals using PMUs from different vendors.
 Collecting phasors from PMUs using substation
PDC.
 Transfer substation PDC data to OpenPDC (control
center PDC) using SDN, which allows simulation
of different communication system failures (such as
latency and data loss).
 Archive phasor data using PI-Historian server.
 Perform fault location study on a complex system
model which can better reflect actual field
conditions. Evaluate performance of fault location
application by comparing its output results with the
input fault scenarios inserted with SIL simulations.
Figure 5 shows the physical connection of SIL
synchrophasor testbed equipment/software setup.

Figure 5. SIL synchrophasor testbed physical setup

(number of buses, type of lines), and system operating
conditions prior to or during fault. The test using actual
size system from a utility interested in the
implementation is underway.
A summary of results for a few test cases with
different fault specifications is listed in Table I. The
proposed method correctly detects fault type and in
most of cases locates fault point within error of 1%.
Figure 6 depicts the phasor angle captured by four
closest PMUs to the fault point of case 6 from Table I
(to keep it readable). From Figure 7, it can be seen that
the electromechanical wave oscillation following the
fault (a-g with 20Ω at 0.9 pu from bus 19) on line 1920 is first detected at bus 21 at t=5.43 sec and then
detected at buses 15, 23 and 17, respectively.

3.3 Use-Case 1: Impact of power system

3.4 Use-Case 2: Impact of PMU/PDC failure

The fault location application is initially tested
using IEEE118 bus test system [19]. The SIL testbed
makes it possible to test FL method with various
scenarios such as changing fault specifications, size

Capability of deploying virtual PMUs using the SIL
testbed makes it viable to study effect of unavailability
of PMU streams on evaluation of the FL method. The
average error of the method vs. total number of out of
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3.5 Use-Case 3: Impact of PMU data quality
issues
The SDN controller within SIL testbed makes it
possible to test robustness of the FL method vs. PMU
bad data by emulating communication error including
packet delay, packet loss, and channel failure. Figure 8
shows the average error of the algorithm once PMU
streams are affected. In scenario 1, PMU streams in
area 1 are emulated with random packet delay in the
range of 20ms. An a-g fault with 1Ω resistance is
inserted at the middle of 20 different lines at each of
the three areas, and the average error in each area is
obtained (first three columns of Figure 8 from left). It
can be observed that the effect of PMU bad data is felt
when the fault is occurred in the same area as the
affected PMUs. The same is concluded from second
and third scenarios where the PMUs in area 2 and area
3 are emulated, respectively.
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Figure 8. Effect of PMU bad data on fault location
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Figure 6. PMUs stream of buses 15, 17, 21, and 23

4.

service PMUs in each area is depicted in Figure 7. To
perform this study, once each PMU is taken out of
service, an a-g fault with 1Ω resistance is inserted at
the middle of 20 different lines at each of the three
areas and average error percentage is used for plotting.
Figure 7 shows that the method remains accurate under
the circumstance that five PMUs in each area are out of
service.

Microgrids have emerged as a potential building
block for the smart gird to enable effective, modular,
and efficient integration of renewable energy resources
in the host power system. A microgrid can operate as a
standalone system, thereby increasing the resiliency
and reliability of the power system in case of highimpact events. In recent years, several testbeds have
been developed at universities and industries around
the world. An example is our testbed that includes a
transmission-level control center, a distribution-level
operating center, substation and distribution feeder
automation facilities, software models of renewable
energy devices, and smart meters.
This section discusses the recent additions to this
testbed to allow hardware-in-the-loop real-time
simulation of distribution-level microgrid systems.
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This tool enables evaluation of control strategies
beyond what is possible with a mere software-based
solution before they are implemented in the field.
Otherwise, after field implementation, additional
modifications and tuning can be costly.

custom PSCAD component (Figure 9) reads from these
text files the data written by LabVIEW; similarly,
another custom PSCAD component writes to another
set of text files, which are then read by LabVIEW.
Other methods of interfacing, e.g., using ports, can be
employed for achieving an even higher speed of
communication; however, this work does not further
investigate their application. LabVIEW reads the
PSCAD output files and writes their contents to the
output channels of the DAQ module. The external
controller then reads the data from the DAQ module.
While the read/write operations on a file add a certain
overhead to the simulation, this overhead is accounted
for using the synchronization algorithm as discussed
below.
Figure 10 shows the timeline for real-time
operation enforcement. Real-time simulation is
enforced by ensuring that PSCAD runs neither faster
nor slower than real time. To avoid slower-than-realtime simulation, based on the available hardware, the
simulation time step and the plot time step of PSCAD

4.1. Application development
Similar to an active distribution system, a microgrid
includes several components, e.g., distributed energy
resources (DER), capacitors, controllable loads, and
power electronic devices. In many cases, each of these
devices is controlled by a local controller [26], [27],
which is supervised by a central controller [28], [29].
Design of these controllers is key to stable, reliable,
and optimal operation of the system [30]. This design
needs to be
(1) Evaluated via simulation studies in tools such as
MATLAB/Simulink [31], PSCAD/EMTDC [32],
and DigSILENT PowerFactory [33]. In this case,
both the microgrid and the controllers are
implemented in the simulation environment [34].
(2) Validated via hardware implementation. In this
case, as discussed in this paper, the control
algorithm is implemented in the same physical
hardware that will eventually implement the
controllers in the field.
The solution developed for this application is
discussed in the following subsections.

Figure 9. Custom PSCAD component for interfacing

Figure 2 (on page 2) shows the schematic diagram
of the developed software-based hardware-in-the-loop
simulation platform. This platform has four main
components: 1) a power system simulator, 2) a
hardware interface, 3) a physical controller, and 4) the
synchronization and coordination logic. In this paper,
PSCAD/EMTDC is employed for simulation of the
power system due to its flexibility, high speed,
extensibility, and wide acceptance in the industry for
electromagnetics-type transients simulation. The
physical controller in this case is the National
Instrument (NI) cRIO. NI cRIO is a robust, industrygrade controller capable of executing very fast control
commands in its FPGA or efficient processing in its
CPU. Since NI cRIO is used to implement the
controller logic, the natural choice for the interface is
LabVIEW (also developed by NI). LabVIEW
interfaces to a data acquisition (DAQ) module that
communicates with the external controller. However,
PSCAD and LabVIEW cannot natively communicate
with each other. Therefore, text files are employed as
the interface media between these two software tools.
Each measurement is written to a separate file. A

PSCAD Simulation time

PSCAD writes
to file

PSCAD locks LabVIEW
write operation

PSCAD reads
from file

PSCAD allows LabVIEW
write operation

y=
x

4.2. Testbed setup

After communication,
wait until x=y
Communication with the
external controller after
certain time steps
Each rectangle shows the
system simulation for 1
sample time

Real time
NI-cRIO continually implements the control algorithms and sends and
receives data in every time step
LabVIEW continually reads the last updated (by PSCAD) file and writes
the last updated (by NI-cRIO) data to file (unless locked by PSCAD

Figure 10. Timeline of the proposed real-time
simulation
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are selected sufficiently large and the rate of
communication with the controller device (that is,
read/write operations) is selected sufficiently low. To
avoid faster-than-real-time simulation, a Fortran code
compares the simulation time with the real time and
introduces a delay if the simulation time is ahead of
real time. (Fortran language is used because it is the
native programming language for developing new
components in PSCAD; in general other programming
languages, including MATLAB and C, can also be
used and linked to PSCAD.) After a certain number of
simulation time steps, PSCAD communicates with the
controller device. After the communication process,
the simulation time and the real time are compared and
the algorithm mentioned earlier is called to enforce
real-time simulation.

limits by appropriate capacitor switching when the
loads change. This logic is implemented in the NI
cRIO controller.
Figure 13 shows the difference between the
simulation time and the real time for the test microgrid
without and with real time enforcing scheme. Without
real-time enforcement, the simulation runs faster than
the realtime and the difference between the two
increases linearly with time. With the proposed realtime enforcement scheme, the difference between the
real time and the simulation time is always maintained
around zero.

4.3 Use-Case 1: Validation of Real-Time
Simulation
To evaluate the performance of the proposed
software-based HIL real-time simulator, an
experimental setup is developed. As shown in Figure
11, the power system is simulated in PSCAD (right
hand side of the computer screen), which is run side by
side with LabVIEW (left side of the computer screen).
PSCAD communicates with LabVIEW via text files,
and LabVIEW communicates with the physical
controller (NI cRIO) via DAQ modules. The
oscilloscope is used to capture the measured
waveforms. Figure 12 shows the test microgrid, which
includes three switched loads and two switched
capacitors. The loads can be manually switched on and
off. The control objective is to maintain the voltages of
the buses of capacitors C1 and C2 within the specified
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Figure 12. Test microgrid in grid-connected mode
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Figure 13. Difference between the simulation time and the
real time of a sample simulation case study without and
with the proposed real-time enforcing scheme.

4.4 Use-Case 2: Maintaining Voltage at
Capacitor Buses with Load Switching
In this scenario, the ability of the proposed HIL
architecture as well as the control system to maintain
the voltages of the system within the desired levels as
system loads change is evaluated. To observe the
physical signals, as shown in Figure 14, an
oscilloscope is used to monitor the desired simulation
variables. Figure 15 shows the PSCAD simulation
results without and with the controller device
interfaced to the simulator. Prior to switching the loads
on (at t = 70 s), the bus voltages are within the defined
limits ( VC1  [0.98,0.995], VC2  [0.99,0.998] ). When

Figure 11. Setup of the proposed software-based HIL
real-time simulation

the load increases, the voltages of both buses decrease.
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remote access [35]. This implementation facilitates
ease of use for a versatile community of users with
different expertise and also serves as an educational
platform that allows users to learn about the
importance and criticality of cyber security of critical
infrastructures such as smart grid. The remote access
framework supports the following story board
constructs focusing on WAMPAC applications.
Figure 14. Using an oscilloscope for observing the single
phase voltage of a bus

5.1 Use-Case 1: Cascading outage through a
coordinated cyber attack on power system’s
wide-area protection scheme [21]
In this scenario (depicted in Figure 17), the attack
involves a combination of two coordinated attack
actions on a power system protection scheme known as
Remedial Action Scheme (RAS). Typically, RAS is
intended to take specific protective measures to prevent
the spread of large disturbances under heavy system
loading conditions. However, an attacker could
intelligently trigger the operation of this RAS by
creating a data integrity attack on unencrypted
communication between the substation and the control
center (or by performing a replay attack if the
communication channel is encrypted) that uses the
DNP3 protocol. In order to create a cascading outage,
the attacker also blocks the communication between
the protection relays that are involved in the RAS
through a targeted Denial of Service (DoS) attack on
one of the protection controllers. In this example, first
line outage is caused by tripping the relay between Bus
B7-B5 and simultaneously a DoS attack is performed
on the RAS Controller or its communication channel

Figure 15. HIL real-time simulation results: (a) readings
of PSCAD plots; (b) measurements of the physical
oscilloscope. From top to bottom: Voltages of the
capacitor buses when the external controller is not
interfaced to the simulation and both capacitors are
switched off; and voltages of the capacitor buses when
the external controller is interfaced to the simulation.

Without the external controller, the voltages of both
buses decrease significantly, as shown in Figure 15(a)top. With the external controller interfaced to PSCAD,
when the feeder load increases, the controller regulates
the voltages of these buses, Figure 15(a)-bottom.
Figure 15 (b) shows the voltages of the same buses as
measured by an oscilloscope. Figures 15(a) and (b) use
the same scales for horizontal and vertical axes.
Equivalence of the time scales of PSCAD plot
(simulation time) and the oscilloscope (real time)
validates the effectiveness of the proposed real-time
enforcement scheme.

5. CPS testbed use for developing and
evaluating cybersecurity applications
The PowerCyber has automated front-end and
back-end to support remote access to the testbed. The
experimentation framework has been implemented
using story-board based approach that enables defining
both power and cyber system topologies and
configuring both attacks and defense measures. Figure
16 shows the web-based front-end of the testbed for

Figure 17. Coordinated attack on RAS (9-bus)
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preventing its “ramp down” command not reaching
Generation Controller of G2. This prevents the
successful operation of the RAS and in turn initiates
secondary protection to be tripped to avoid thermal
overload on the impacted transmission line (B7-B8).
As a result of this coordinated attack involving data
integrity attack to trip a breaker and a DoS attack on
RAS communications, the overall system frequency is
also affected as it causes the islanding of a generator
(G2) from the rest of the system.

As a result of the work presented, the following are
the contributions:
 It has been demonstrated that the use of testbeds
offers new opportunities to develop more robust
solutions that can be evaluated under realistic
conditions well ahead of their implementation in a
production system, which saves the time and cost
of development and deployment.
 SIL testbed has been invaluable in testing new FL
application since it enabled end-to-end evaluation
of the various implementation impacts on the FL
error such as power system scale, management of
PMU/PDC measurement, and handling of data
quality issues.
 HIL real-time simulation can be a valuable step,
after offline simulation, when evaluating the
performance of controllers within a microgrid,
which otherwise is hard to evaluate using only the
conventional modeling and simulation methods.
 CPS security testbeds are enabling technologies
that have the potential to accelerate R&D,
education and training in smart grid security by
providing realistic platforms for system-scale as
well as component-specific experiments pertaining
to vulnerability assessment, impact analysis,
security validations, attack-defense evaluations,
and forensic analysis.
 The testbeds also enable bridging the gap between
academic research and industry practice and can
contribute to workforce development in this
growing area of importance.
 From a technical point of view, architecting a
modular CPS testbed for smart grid with support
for scalability and programmability is in its early
stages and hence significant further research needs
to be done.

5.2 Use-Case 2: Manipulating Automatic
Generation Control (AGC) measurements
and/or controls to affect system frequency [36]
In this scenario, the attack involves a stealthy
manipulation of measurements/controls used in
Automatic Generation Control (AGC) algorithm to
destabilize and affect the frequency of the power grid.
This attack is a version of the classic Man-In-TheMiddle (MitM) attack, where the attacker intercepts the
communication between the control center and the
remote substations (forward communication) and
chooses to stealthily modify the frequency and/or tieline measurements going to the control center, or the
AGC control commands going to the generating
stations (reverse communication). For example,
manipulating the forward communication is achieved
by executing an ARP (Address Resolution Protocol)
poisoning attack first, which tricks the remote
substation to forward the data to the attacker before
sending it to the external gateway at the control center.
The attacker then selects targeted information
(measurements) that is to be manipulated and modifies
it maliciously using custom attack scripts and forwards
it to the control center gateway. As a result of this
manipulation, the AGC algorithm ends up computing
wrong Area Control Error (ACE) values that cause the
generators to ramp up or ramp down in the wrong
direction. As a result, there will be a steady deviation
in system frequency, which will trigger shedding of
some loads in an attempt to restore the frequency. In
summary, a sustained stealthy attack could potentially
lead to a major load shedding, which in turn could also
trigger cascading events.
The testbed has been used for impact
characterization of AGC algorithm over a multi-area
system and also for evaluating the effectiveness of
mitigation algorithms, such as firewalls, intrusion
detection systems, and model-based anomaly detection
that utilizes cyber-physical system properties.
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